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INTRODUCTION
A farmer sets out to stake his claim to the American Dream. Like his
father and generations before, the farmer desires only to make an honest 
living. The farmer purchases a vast tract of land in Northern California 
with plans to grow wheat on the property. The farmer plows the field and 
plants the wheat. Satisfied with his work, the farmer sits back and waits 
for the crops to grow. A few weeks before the harvest, two Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) agents arrive at the farmer’s fields. The agents 
claim that by plowing his fields the farmer has violated the Clean Water 
Act’s (CWA) provision protecting the “waters of the United States.” The 
farmer is confused. He doesn’t understand how the CWA is violated if the 
only water in the fields comes from the irrigation system he installed.
The agents inform him that the field constitutes a wetland and that he 
failed to acquire the requisite permit to plow the field. The only wetlands 
the farmer knows are those down in Louisiana where his favorite show 
“Swamp Citizens” is filmed. The EPA fines the farmer various amounts 
totaling over two million dollars. Believing there is a mistake, the farmer 
challenges these fines in court. Unfortunately, the court finds that the 
farmer did violate the Clean Water Act by dredging a “seasonal wetland.”1
The farmer reluctantly settles the case for one million dollars. Now, nearly 
bankrupt, the farmer’s dream has turned into a nightmare. 
This distressing hypothetical is based on an actual farmer’s encounter 
with the EPA and the CWA’s nebulous “waters of the United States” 
(WOTUS) definition.2 The ambiguous definition leaves both farmers and 
legal scholars alike, questioning the scope of governmental regulations of 
the CWA. Without a clear determination of what areas fall under the 
purview of the CWA, the rights of property owners are at risk. The various 
interpretations of the WOTUS provision causes the EPA, courts, and 
property owners to struggle to determine the scope of the EPA’s regulatory 
authority. The purpose behind the CWA and the definition of WOTUS 
indicate that the intent of the drafters was the protection of water bodies
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1. “Seasonal wetlands” are areas that are dry for one or more seasons every 
year or may only be wet periodically. What is a Wetland?, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY
(Oct. 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/QZY9-T2G5.
2. See Alexis Garcia, How Obama’s EPA Nearly Bankrupted John Duarte’s 
Farm, REASON.COM (Sept. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/7MGM-U5K4.
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from pollutants. However, the EPA and courts have expanded the 
provision to include things that play a vital role in the ecology of the water 
bodies, such as wetlands and tributaries.3 Wetlands are not always wet; 
they may be wet seasonally or periodically. Under the CWA, there is no 
clear way to determine what constitutes a wetland, leaving the scope of 
federal regulation equally unclear.
There have been many controversial and unsuccessful attempts to 
resolve this issue: the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) 
interpreted the scope of the “waters of the United States;”4 the EPA, under 
the Obama administration, promulgated the Clean Water Rule in 2015 in 
an attempt to clarify the WOTUS definition; and the EPA, under the 
Trump administration, proposed a new definition.5 The best solution to 
dispel the confusion is for Congress to revisit and amend the CWA,
redefining WOTUS once and for all. 
To help the reader fully understand how the definition of WOTUS
creates so many problems, Part I of this Comment surveys the statutory 
history of the “waters of the United States.” Part II examines the 
interpretation of “waters of the United States” by the Supreme Court. Part 
III analyzes the EPA’s Clean Water Rule (CWR) promulgated in 2015 and 
the ongoing battles in federal court with states and property owners 
fighting its implementation. Part IV addresses the EPA’s newly proposed 
rule to rescind the CWR and redefine WOTUS pursuant to President 
Trump’s Executive Order. Part V concludes the best solution is for 
Congress to amend the CWA by narrowing the definition of WOTUS to a
more commonsense understanding of the term “waters.” This more 
permanent solution is necessary to put an end to the confusion and over-
regulation.
I. NAVIGATING THE “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES”
It was not until the mid-twentieth century, as a response to growing 
public concern, that the United States government formally enacted 
regulations to protect water sources from pollution.6 The Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) of 1948 was the first major federal law 
to address water pollution.7 The Act sought to encourage water pollution 
                                                                                                            
3. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: How Wetlands are Defined and 
Identified, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Sept. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/H59Z-VEAE.
4. See discussion infra Part II. 
5. See infra note 127.
6. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, History of the Clean Water Act (Sept. 16, 
2017), https://perma.cc/W53W-F6SG.
7. Id.
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control at the state level.8 Under the FWPCA, Congress had no authority 
to establish water quality standards, limit discharges, or engage in 
enforcement actions for interstate waters.9 It would take an additional three 
decades for the federal government to take a more active role in the 
protection of what would become the “waters of the United States.”10
Sweeping concerns over water pollution prompted a series of 
amendments in 1972 to the FWPCA known as the Clean Water Act 
(CWA).11 The CWA established a basic structure for regulating discharges 
of pollutants into the “waters of the United States” and set quality 
standards for surface waters.12 The current CWA generally prohibits the 
discharge of any pollutant by any person into the WOTUS.13 Discharge 
under the CWA refers to “any addition of any pollutant into ‘navigable 
waters’ from any point source.”14 Pollution here refers to “the man-made 
or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and 
radiological integrity of water.”15 The CWA further provides a list of 
pollutants discharged into water including: dredged spoil, solid waste, 
sewage, garbage, chemical wastes, rock, sand, and agricultural waste.16
The CWA interprets the term “pollutants” broadly enough to even include 
dirt. Thus, almost anything that involves moving dirt or depositing fill
materials for construction can constitute a discharge of pollutants into the 
WOTUS.
The CWA gives federal regulators the authority to promulgate and 
enforce regulations to protect America’s “navigable waters.”17 “Navigable 
waters,” defined as “waters of the United States,” include the territorial 
seas.18 The CWA does not, however, identify which water bodies fall 
under the umbrella of “waters of the United States.” In 1974, in an attempt 
to provide guidance, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”)
interpreted “navigable waters” as “waters of the United States which are 
                                                                                                            
8. Kayla A. Currie, Clear Waters Ahead? The Clean Water Rule Attempts 
To Bring Clarity To The Scope Of The Clean Water Act, 47 CUMB. L. REV. 191,
198 (2017).
9. Id.
10. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 6.
11. Id.
12. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Summary of the Clean Water Act (Sept. 16, 
2017), https://perma.cc/K52Z-8GEQ.
13. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012).
14. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2012).
15. Id. at § 1362(19).
16. Id. at § 1362(6).
17. Id. at § 1362(7).
18. Id.
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subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and presently, or have been in the 
past, or may be in the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate 
or foreign commerce.”19 Over the course of the next eight years, the Corps 
further expanded the definition to include adjacent wetlands and 
tributaries of navigable and interstate waters.20 While the expansion of 
federal regulation to tributaries that feed into “waters of the United States” 
is a reasonable step in furtherance of the Clean Water Act, the inclusion of 
wetlands in this expanded definition requires a greater logical leap and 
raises some concern. 
A. What’s a Wetland Good For? Absolutely Nothing!
Determining whether a wetland falls into the category of WOTUS is 
a fundamental problem for identifying what constitutes a wetland. The 
presence of hydric soils and hydrophytes sometimes acts as an 
identification of wetlands.21 It is often difficult to determine from outward 
appearance whether a piece of land is classified as a wetland. For example, 
despite their classification as wetlands, the Florida Everglades and 
Mississippi bottomland hardwood swamps are often dry.22 This is because 
“the amount of water present in wetlands fluctuates as a result of rainfall 
patterns, snow melt, dry seasons, and long droughts.”23 The Corps and the 
EPA define wetlands for regulatory purposes as follows:
Wetlands means those areas that are inundated or saturated by 
surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to 
support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a 
prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil 
conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, 
and similar areas.24
                                                                                                            
19. Navigation and Navigable Waters, 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1) (1974).
20. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123-
4 (1985) (recounting the expansion of the Corp’s interpretation).
21. “The upper part of the soil is saturated with water at growing season 
temperatures, soil organisms consume the oxygen in the soil and cause conditions 
unsuitable for most plants. Such conditions also cause the development of soil 
characteristics (such as color and texture) of so-called 'hydric soils'. The plants 
that can grow in such conditions, such as marsh grasses, are called ‘hydrophytes.’" 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(4).
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Though humid and muddy, wetlands are a vital component of the aquatic 
ecosystem.25 This key component to various environmental processes is 
disappearing at an alarming rate due to natural disasters, storms, and 
human intervention.26 Between the 1950’s and 1970’s, an average of 
458,000 acres of the United States’ wetlands disappeared each year.27
Louisiana’s three million acres of wetlands are disappearing at the rate of 
about seventy-five square kilometers annually.28 The significance of the 
wetlands’ role in the environment, coupled with rapid disappearance of 
these lands, led to increased regulation and protection. The rapid loss of 
wetlands is a cause for concern, but it should not be used as a pretense to 
expand federal regulations of land under the CWA.
B. Section 404 Permitting Process: A License to Fill
Section 404 of the CWA gives the Corps the authority to grant permits 
for the discharge of dredged or fill materials into the navigable waters.29
Failure to comply with the permit process’s conditions and limitations can 
result in civil and criminal liability.30 The common applicants for these 
permits are individual property owners and businesses. The Corps issues 
jurisdictional determinations on whether a body of water will be regulated 
under the CWA by performing a jurisdictional delineation of waters on a 
property.31 The Corps performs jurisdictional delineations on a property to 
determine which waters are classified as WOTUS.32 The Corps uses the 
1987 Corps of Engineers Wetland Delineation Manual and ten regional 
supplements to conduct wetland delineation.33 The manual organizes 
characteristics of potential wetlands into three categories: hydric soils, 
hydrophytic vegetation, and hydrology.34 During a wetland delineation, 
                                                                                                            
25. See Joseph G. Theis, Wetlands Loss and Agriculture: The Failed Federal 
Regulation of Farming Activities Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 9
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1991).
26. Threats to Wetlands, WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE,
https://perma.cc/NK86-4NBW (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).
27. See EPA’S Report on The Environment: Wetland Extent, Change, and 
Sources of Change, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://perma.cc/67VG-7XL3 (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2017).
28. Jefferess Williams, Louisiana Costal Wetlands: A Resource At Risk,
U.S.G.S., https://perma.cc/4GMS-35Y9 (last visited Sept. 21, 2017).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012).
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), (c).
31. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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the Corps surveys a project area to determine whether the three 
characteristics are present.35 An area that possesses the three above 
characteristics is a wetland and thus subject to Section 404’s permit 
process.
Section 404’s permit program raises a specific point of controversy 
regarding federal wetland regulation.36 Critics of the permit program call 
it an “unprecedented federal presence in land use regulation,” while 
defenders see it as “the most effective means of preserving wetlands.”37
Landowners and businesses that oppose the permit requirements claim the 
process is time-consuming and financially burdensome. A study 
highlighting the cost and delays for a Section 404 permit found the average 
applicant for an individual permit spends 788 days and $271,596 to 
complete the process, with the average applicant for a nationwide permit 
spending 313 days and $28,915.38
The broad scope of pollutants and the uncertainty of which areas of 
land constitute “waters” under the CWA make it difficult for property 
owners to determine when a permit is required before altering their 
property. In Sackett v. EPA, the EPA threatened a couple with a $75,000 
per day fine for placing gravel on essentially dry land to build a home in a 
subdivision.39 The Sacketts owned a property north of Priest Lake, but 
separated from the lake by several lots containing permanent structures.40
The Sacketts filled in part of their lot with dirt and rock in preparation for 
constructing a house.41 The EPA sent a compliance order asserting the 
following: (1) the Sackett’s property was subject to the CWA, (2) the act 
of placing fill material on the property was a violation, and (3) an EPA 
work plan required the Sacketts to immediately restore the property.42 The 
compliance order asserted that the Sacketts’ lot was an adjacent wetland 
to a “navigable water,” i.e. Priest Lake.43 This case highlights how broad 
interpretations of WOTUS and pollutants can make an act, such as laying 
                                                                                                            
35. Id.
36. Michael C. Blumm and D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection 
Under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental 
Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 695, 698 (1989).
37. Id.
38. Daren Bakst, What You Need to Know About the EPA/Corps Water Rule: 
It’s a Power Grab and an Attack on Property Rights, HERITAGE FOUNDATION
(Apr. 29, 2015), https://perma.cc/ATK5-S8RH.
39. Id.
40. Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 124 (2012).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 122.
43. Id. at 124.
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a foundation on perceivably dry land to build a home, a discharge of 
pollutants into WOTUS.
II. SCOTUS TAKES A SWING AT WOTUS
The Corps’ interpretation of “waters of the United States” expanded 
during the eight years after it issued initial guidance in 1974.44 These 
expansive interpretations ultimately led to challenges in federal court. The 
Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) reviewed the scope of 
“navigable waters” under the CWA’s Section 404 permitting program.
SCOTUS interpreted the scope of the “navigable waters” definition in 
three landmark cases: United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
(Riverside); Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (SWANCC); and Rapanos v. United States (Rapanos). 
In this trilogy of cases, SCOTUS addressed the scope of the Corps’ power 
to assert regulatory authority over wetlands. Each opinion illustrates the 
Court’s struggle to define the scope of the ambiguous phrase “waters of 
the United States.”
A. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
In 1985, the Corps filed suit against Riverside Bayview, Inc. seeking 
an injunction to prevent further filling of low-lying marshlands without a 
permit.45 The Corps believed the marshlands to be “adjacent wetland” 
subject to the federal regulation.46 The marshland in dispute was “adjacent
to but not connected to Lake St. Clair, a navigable water.”47 The district 
court found the marshlands constituted a wetland and granted an 
injunction to prevent filling without a permit.48 The Sixth Circuit 
disagreed, construing the Corps’ regulations to exclude from the category 
of “adjacent wetlands” those wetlands that were not subject to flooding by 
adjacent navigable waters at a frequency sufficient to support the growth 
aquatic vegetation.49
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court deferred to the Corps’ 
ecological judgment that adjacent wetlands “in reasonable proximity to 
other waters of the United States” are “inseparably bound up” with the 
waters to which they are adjacent, and the Court further upheld the 
                                                                                                            
44. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1).
45. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985).
46. Id. at 125.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 125.
49. Id.
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inclusion of “adjacent wetlands” in the regulatory definition of “waters of 
the United States.”50 The Court conceded that “it may appear unreasonable 
to classify lands, wet or otherwise as waters;”51 however, where on the 
continuum to find the limit of “waters” was far from obvious, the 
classification was appropriate.52 The Court gave deference to the Army
Corps of Engineers’ interpretation, finding that Congress’ concern for 
protection of water quality and aquatic ecosystems indicated its intent to 
regulate wetlands.53 The Court did not address whether “wetlands that are 
not adjacent to bodies of open water” fall within the jurisdiction of the 
CWA, a holding resulting in the expansion of the Corps’ jurisdiction over 
WOTUS to “adjacent wetlands.”
B. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers
In SWANCC (2001), the Supreme Court addressed whether “isolated 
waters” fell within the jurisdiction of the CWA. The Solid Waste Agency 
sought to utilize an abandoned mining site as a solid waste disposal site 
and contacted the Corps to determine the necessity of a permit.54 The 
Corps originally concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the site due to the 
lack of “wetlands,” or areas which support “vegetation typically adapted 
for life in saturated soil conditions.”55 The Corps then reversed its position 
and asserted jurisdiction pursuant to the “Migratory Bird Rule.”56 The 
Corps believed that filling the pits would disturb 121 migratory bird 
species that depended on the seasonal ponds created by the abandoned 
gravel pits.57
SCOTUS rejected the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction, holding that the 
use of “isolated,” non-navigable intrastate ponds by migratory birds did 
not provide a sufficient basis for the exercise of federal regulatory 
authority under the CWA.58 The majority held that the Corps exceeded its 
authority, finding that a “significant nexus” between the wetlands at issue 
                                                                                                            
50. Id. at 134.
51. Id. at 132.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 134.
54. Id. at 131, n.8; Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United 
States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 163 (2001).
55. Id. at 164.
56. The Migratory Bird Rule extended jurisdiction over interstate waters 
“which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state 
lines.” Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 167.
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and the adjacent “navigable waters” is required to invoke jurisdiction 
under Section 404 of the CWA.59 The Court distinguished this case from 
Riverside because the gravel pits here remained isolated from, and not 
adjacent to, navigable waters.60 The Court concluded that the Corps’ 
assertion of jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats would result in a 
“significant impingement of the state’s traditional and primary power over 
land and water use.”61 The Supreme Court’s holding restricted the Corps’ 
expansive exercise of jurisdiction but left many questions unanswered. 
The scope of the CWA’s jurisdiction was still unclear after the ruling 
in SWANCC. Riverside held that “adjacent wetlands” fell under the 
CWA’s jurisdiction, while SWANCC held that “isolated waters” did not. 
As a result of this uncertainty, the circuit split on the extent of the 
regulatory authority the Corps had over wetlands near non-navigable 
tributaries that flowed into navigable rivers and non-adjacent wetlands.62
C. Rapanos v. United States
The Supreme Court’s most recent decision in Rapanos (2006) resulted 
in a plurality opinion which does not provide much guidance.63 The Court 
consolidated two cases64 concerning land not adjacent to “navigable 
waters” but adjacent to non-navigable tributaries that flowed into 
“navigable waters.”65 The Court considered whether the wetlands near 
ditches or man-made drains that eventually emptied into traditional 
navigable waters constituted "waters of the United States" under the 
CWA.66 The Solicitor General argued that broad deference should be 
given to the Corps’ interpretation.67 The plurality rejected this argument 
and sought to rein in the government’s interpretation, ultimately 
remanding the case without reaching a consensus.68
                                                                                                            
59. Id.
60. Id. at 168.
61. Id. at 174.
62. Bradford C. Mank, Implementing Rapanos - Will Justice Kennedy's 
Significant Nexus Test Provide a Workable Standard for Lower Courts, 
Regulators, and Developers?, 40 IND. L. REV. 291, 291-92 (2007).
63. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, (2006).
64. The two consolidated cases are: Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers; and United States v. Rapanos.
65. Rapanos, 547 U.S. 729.
66. Id.
67. Currie, supra note 8, at 208. 
68. Id.
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Justices Scalia and Kennedy disagreed over the scope of the 
jurisdiction under the CWA.69 Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality (4-
1-4), held the CWA’s phrase "waters of the United States" included “only 
relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies of water 
‘forming geographic features’ described in ordinary parlance as streams, 
oceans, rivers, and lakes.”70 Scalia stated that “these terms connote 
continuously present, fixed bodies of water, as opposed to ordinarily dry 
channels through which water occasionally of intermittently flows.”71 The 
phrase did not include intermittent or ephemeral channels or channels that 
periodically provided drainage for rainfall.72 Justice Scalia acknowledged 
that the “waters of the United States” definition should not be limited to 
the traditional “navigable in fact” standard.73 Scalia’s opinion narrowed 
the scope of the CWA by shifting the focus of interpretation to the term 
“water” rather than the qualifiers “navigable” and “of the United States.”74
Under Scalia’s approach, the CWA encompasses only those wetlands that 
possess a continuous surface connection with “waters of the United States” 
in their own right.75
Justice Kennedy concurred, concluding that the appropriate test for the 
scope of jurisdictional waters is whether a water or wetland possessed a 
“‘significant nexus’76 to the waters that are or were navigable in fact or 
that could reasonably be so made.”77 Kennedy suggests wetlands that 
affect covered waters deemed “navigable” are subject to federal 
regulation.78 Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test does not specify 
how much impact a wetland must have on a “navigable water” to 
significantly affect the water quality; however, Justice Kennedy did note 
that adjacency to a non-navigable tributary alone is insufficient to assert 
                                                                                                            
69. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715.
70. Id. at 732.
71. Id. at 732-33.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 731-32.
74. Id. at 731.
75. Id. at 742.
76. Justice Kennedy explained that “Wetlands possess the requisite nexus, 
and thus come within the statutory phrase ‘navigable waters,’ if the wetlands, 
either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, 
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other 
covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’ When, in contrast, 
wetlands' effects on water quality are speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside 
the zone fairly encompassed by the statutory term ‘navigable waters.’” Id. at 780.
77. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
78. Id.
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jurisdiction.79 Justice Kennedy suggested the Corps proceed on a case-by-
case basis when regulating wetlands based on adjacency to non-navigable 
tributaries.80 Furthermore, the Corps may presume covered status for 
similarly situated wetlands in the region.81 Absent a definite standard to 
help determine how much of an effect a wetland must have on a water 
quality, Justice Kennedy’s analysis fails to provide clarity. 
The difference between Justice Scalia’s opinion and Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion stems largely from statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia’s 
approach is based in textualism, while Justice Kennedy looks to the 
legislative purpose of the CWA. Justice Scalia’s standard restricts waters to 
encompass those that accord with the commonsense understanding of the 
term “waters.” Justice Scalia further requires a “continuous connection” 
between the “waters” and wetlands. In contrast, Justice Kennedy’s standard 
focuses on the wetlands’ ecological impact on the waters. Both standards 
accept that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters fall within the purview of
the CWA, but disagree when adjacent non-navigable tributaries only flow 
into navigable waters. The four dissenters argued that the term “waters of 
the United States” encompasses all tributaries and wetlands that satisfy 
either the plurality’s standard or Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” 
standard.82 The dissension soon spilled over into lower courts.
The circuits quickly split over which Justice’s analysis to apply.83 The 
First, Third, and Eighth Circuits concluded that CWA jurisdiction exists if 
the government can satisfy either Justice Kennedy’s concurrence or Justice 
Scalia’s test.84 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits applied Justice Kennedy’s
standard to the facts of particular cases, but did not foreclose the possibility 
that in some cases, Justice Scalia’s test might apply instead.85 The Fifth 
and Sixth Circuits declined to choose between the Scalia and Kennedy 
tests because the waters at issue in the cases before them qualified under 
both standards.86 With the circuits split and an outcry urging the 
promulgation of a new rule, the EPA proposed a new Clean Water Rule in 
2015 to remedy the confusion.
                                                                                                            
79. Id. at 786.
80. Id. at 782. 
81. Id.
82. Id. at 810.
83. Currie, supra note 8, at 210.
84. Paul Larkin, The “Waters of the United States” Rule and the Void-for-
Vagueness Doctrine, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (June 21, 2017), https://perma.cc
/ULH2-B9XN (last visited Sept. 21, 2017).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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III. THE CLEAN WATER RULE MUDDIES THE WATERS
The Obama Administration introduced the Clean Water Rule (CWR) 
in 2015.87 The purpose of this rule was to clarify which waters constitute 
“navigable waters.”88 The CWR aimed to precisely and predictably 
determine the jurisdictional reach of the CWA.89 The intent was to ground 
the new rule in law and science, shaped by public input.90 The CWR 
maintained the old definition of “navigable waters” as “waters of the 
United States” and the territorial seas but also accounted for past Supreme 
Court rulings, public comment, and the EPA’s 2015 Connectivity of 
Streams and Wetlands to Downstream Water Assessment.91 Notably, the 
CWR sought to clarify which types of waters are covered categorically, 
covered on a case-by-case basis, or not covered at all.92 The CWR 
identifies the following six categories of waters that as per se 
jurisdictional: (1) traditional navigable waters, (2) interstate waters, (3) 
territorial seas, (4) impoundments of jurisdictional waters, (5) tributaries, 
and (6) adjacent waters.93 The CWR also lists two categories of waters of 
which jurisdiction is determined on a case-specific basis applying the 
“significant nexus” standard.94
The CWR expands the phrase “waters of the United States” to include 
streams and wetlands that significantly impact “downstream water quality 
                                                                                                            
87. Rebecca Long, What You Need To Know About The Clean Water Rule,
AMERICAN RIVERS (Aug. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/MW45-JASV (last visited 
Sept. 16, 2017).
88. Id.
89. Clean Water Rule: Definitions of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. 
Reg. 124, 37054 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328).
90. Id.
91. Long, supra note 87. (The Connectivity of Stream and Wetlands to 
Downstream Water Assessment’s purpose was to summarize the current 
understandings about the connectivity and mechanisms by which streams and 
wetlands affect the physical, chemical, and biological integrity of downstream 
waters.) ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Connectivity of Streams and Wetlands to 
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and form the foundation of our nation’s water resources.”95 In addition to 
the CWR’s attempt to clarify WOTUS, the new rule incorporated the 
“significant nexus” analysis of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in 
Rapanos.96 In determining the existence of a “significant nexus,” the EPA 
shall assess the waters by evaluating their aquatic functions.97 A water has 
a significant nexus when any single function or combination of functions 
performed by the water, alone or together with similarly situated waters in 
the region, contributes significantly to the chemical, physical, or biological 
integrity of the nearest water.98
The CWR immediately came under fire by critics because the addition 
of the “significant nexus” analysis created a catch-all provision that 
extended regulation to land that does not fall within the six categories of 
the CWR’s WOTUS definition.99 Waters that do not fit within one of the 
categories and do not qualify as a “neighboring” water are subject to a 
“significant nexus” analysis under the CWR.100 The CWR’s inclusion of 
the catch-all provision goes beyond the scope of Justice Kennedy’s 
significant nexus test and allows the government even more regulatory 
authority over private lands. 
When the EPA promulgated the CWR in August 2015, various 
challenges emerged immediately, including thirty-one states that filed suit 
to stay the rule.101 Both chambers of Congress sought to overturn the CWR 
by invoking the Congressional Review Act102 but failed to receive the 
requisite majority to overcome President Obama’s veto power.103
Challengers claim that the EPA will use this rule to micromanage private 
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land use.104 These challengers, many of which are private landowners,
believe the CWR’s overreach will result in increased costs and more 
hurdles to jump through for property owners and states to utilize their 
lands.105 On August 27, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
North Dakota enjoined the applicability of the CWR in the thirteen states 
challenging the rule before that court.106 Soon after the Sixth Circuit stayed 
the CWR nationwide, leaving the pre-rule regime to govern while the 
CWR is under review.107 On January 13, 2017, SCOTUS granted certiorari 
on the question of whether the Sixth Circuit has original jurisdiction to 
review challenges to the CWR.108 One year later, on January 22, 2018, the 
Supreme Court held that the courts of appeal do not have original 
jurisdiction to review challenges to the 2015 rule.109 It is important to note 
that the Supreme Court was not deciding the validity of the CWR, but only 
whether the district courts or courts of appeal had jurisdiction over 
challenges to the CWR. The challengers, which included industry and 
environmental groups and eighteen states, preferred to have the merits of 
their arguments heard first at the district court level.110
The challengers argue that the CWR is arbitrary and capricious 
because the agency did not adequately provide notice and comment 
rulemaking111 and the final rule substantially varies from the proposed 
rule.112 Specifically, they contend that there is no record of scientific 
support for the distance limitations in the final rule.113 The scientific report 
drafted by the Scientific Advisory Board was not released until after the 
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new rule was published, failing to allow for any comment on the 
findings.114 The challengers of the rule argue that the final rule is not a 
product of reasoned decision-making and is impermissibly arbitrary and 
capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).115 The APA 
provides that “[a] reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”116
Many states challenged the rule on the grounds that the EPA usurped 
states’ authority over land management.117 The CWA provides that “it is 
the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary 
responsibilities and rights of states to prevent, reduce, and eliminate 
pollution, to plan the development and use of land and water resources.”118
Under the CWA, states provide an important role in the administration of 
the CWA because they have a better sense of their specific environmental 
needs than the federal government and can tailor regulation to their 
needs.119
Challengers also argue the rule is too broad and the result is an 
unnecessary overreach that threatens private farm owners’ land.120 Despite 
the EPA’s assurances, landowners worry the CWR might include 
agricultural ditches, canals, and drainages in the definition of “tributary.”121
The CWR defines tributary for the first time as water that contributes flow, 
whether directly or indirectly, into a WOTUS.122 The definition goes on to 
state that tributaries can be natural or man-made.123 With the expansive 
scope of the current CWA jurisdiction already causing problems for 
landowners, the CWR makes private landowners nervous.
IV. POTUS SHAKES UP WOTUS
On June 27, 2017, the EPA, under the Trump administration 
announced a roll back on the Obama-era policy’s protection of more than 
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half the nation’s streams.124 Former EPA Chief Scott Pruitt125 aimed to 
return the agency to their core focus of protecting the environment while 
following “the letter of the law.”126 The EPA decided to take a new 
direction after President Trump’s Executive Order 13778: “Restoring the 
Rule of Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth By Reviewing the 
‘waters of the United States’ Rule.”127 The Executive Order directed the 
EPA and the Corps to rescind the 2015 CWR and propose a new rule that 
is “appropriate and consistent with the law.”128
The first section of the Executive Order addressed the need to protect 
the Nation’s waters from pollutants, while also highlighting the 
importance of not burdening economy through regulatory uncertainty in 
the process.129 Section two stated that executive agencies have the 
authority to rescind and revise the regulatory definition of “waters of the 
United States,” consistent with the policy guidance in the Executive Order, 
so long as the revised definition remained “authorized under the law and 
based on a reasoned explanation.”130 Section three of the Executive Order 
also directed the agencies to consider interpreting the term “navigable 
waters” in a manner consistent with Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in 
Rapanos.131 This section recommended that the EPA narrow the 
interpretive scope of the term “navigable waters.”132
The Executive Order called for the rescission of a rule that is not 
currently in effect nationwide. The EPA, under the Obama administration, 
promulgated the CWR in 2015, but the Sixth Circuit stayed its effect. To 
carry out the goals of the Executive Order, the EPA will first have to 
propose a rule to rescind the CWR (“Proposed Rule”), before it can 
promulgate a rule to redefine the definition of “navigable waters” (“New
Rule”). To do this, the EPA will have to conduct formal rulemaking in 
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accordance with the APA.133 If the agency ultimately decides to 
promulgate a rule, then it must issue a concise general statement that 
articulates the basis for the rule and respond to the comments it has 
received.134 The Proposed Rule, rescinding the CWR, establishes a clear 
regulatory framework that avoids the inconsistency, uncertainty, and 
confusion that would result if the Sixth Circuit lifted the stay and the CWR 
went into effect.135 This Proposed Rule is intended to ensure that during 
this interim period between the rescission of the CWR and the 
promulgation of the New Rule, the status quo will be maintained, thus 
providing continuity and regulatory certainty for regulated entities, States,
Tribes, and the public.136 If the EPA successfully rescinds the CWR, the 
EPA will have to once again engage in the rulemaking process to redefine 
“navigable waters” as part of its plan to promulgate the New Rule.
In November of 2017, the EPA and the Corps proposed another rule 
(“Suspension Rule”) adding an applicability date to the 2015 CWR two 
years from the final action on this proposal.137 The most likely reason for 
the EPA’s Suspension Rule was to maintain the status quo in the event the
Sixth Circuit’s stay was lifted before rescission of the CWR was complete. 
After holding a notice and comment period, the EPA and Corps issued a 
final rule on February 6, 2018, adding an applicability date of February 6, 
2020, to the 2015 CWR.138 The same day the Suspension Rule went into 
effect, the manner in which the Suspension Rule was enacted was 
immediately challenged in the U.S. District Court of South Carolina by the 
Southern Environmental Law Center.139
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On August 16, 2018, a federal judge in South Carolina issued a 
nationwide injunction to block the Suspension Rule, making the 2015 
CWR applicable in the twenty-six states that have not blocked it.140 The 
district court found that the EPA and Corps violated the APA’s rule 
making procedures by delaying the 2015 CWR.141 The court held it was 
the “agencies’ decision to promulgate the Suspension Rule without 
allowing the public to comment on the substance of either the WOTUS 
Rule or the 1980’s regulations that rendered the notice-and-comment rule 
making infirm under the APA.”142 While the South Carolina decision 
seems to signal a win for environmentalist groups, the battle is far from 
finished. On the following day, August 17, 2018, the American Farm 
Bureau Federation (“AFBF”) and a coalition of businesses notified the 
U.S. District Court in South Carolina that they will appeal the court’s 
ruling.143 “The AFBF also notified the U.S. District Court in Texas – where 
the AFBF filed its original legal challenge to WOTUS – of the South 
Carolina ruling, urging the court to issue a nationwide injunction against 
the 2015 CWR.”144
If the rescission of the CWR is successful, the EPA and the Corps will 
have considerable flexibility to redefine “waters of the United States.” The 
Supreme Court’s case law demonstrates that there is no single, stable 
interpretation of the phrase “waters of the United States.” The lower courts 
have been unable to develop a workable interpretation in the eleven years 
since the Rapanos decision. The EPA has discretion in choosing how to 
construe the CWA based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Chevron v. 
NRDC.145
The Chevron analysis is a two-step inquiry for the judicial review of 
an agency’s interpretation of a statute.146 The first inquiry asks whether the 
statute is ambiguous with respect to the precise question at issue.147 The 
term “navigable waters” remains ambiguous because the courts have 
consistently found non-navigable waters are within the jurisdiction of the 
CWA. Furthermore, the term “waters of the United States” is undoubtedly 
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ambiguous as applications by the EPA and the courts continue to reach 
conflicting interpretations.
The second question examines whether the agency has employed or 
embraced a permissible construction of the statute.148 While the first step 
determines whether the statute creates a zone of ambiguity; if the statute 
creates such an ambiguity, the second step asks whether the agency’s 
interpretation falls within the zone of ambiguity. If the agency’s 
interpretation is permissible, the court may not substitute its own 
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made 
by the administrator of an agency.149 According to Chevron, “[i]f Congress 
has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation
of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute 
by regulation.”150 Ultimately, if a challenge to the EPA’s “new rule” 
redefining WOTUS emerges it is likely that the court would grant 
deference to the EPA’s interpretation.
Under Chevron, the EPA’s proposed rule clarifying and interpreting 
“waters of the United States” is presumptively valid unless proven 
unreasonable. This presumption makes challenging the EPA’s new rule in 
court more difficult. The frequent fluctuation of power in the Executive 
branch presents a problem with this system because the rule is subject to 
rescission and revision every time the Executive branch changes hands. In 
addition to the changing political landscape, rulemaking is a long and 
cumbersome process that results in a merely temporary fix due to the 
possibility of rescission every four years. The EPA closed the notice and 
comment period on its proposed rule to rescind the CWR in October 
2017.151 As of January 2018, the EPA has not promulgated a final rule to 
rescind the CWR, and the Supreme Court has not rendered a decision on 
the Sixth Circuit’s nationwide stay of the CWR.
V. PURIFYING THE WATERS
The Legislative, Judicial, and Executive branches all attempted to 
define “waters of the United States” without success, each resulting in
more confusion and consequences. Judicial interpretations continue to 
split the courts. As a result of the changing presidential administrations, 
the Executive branch is engaged in a political gridlock to rescind and 
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revise. Unfortunately, this is the position that Congress created by not 
providing any clarification despite many years of controversy surrounding 
the interpretation of the CWA. 
The most permanent solution to remedy the ambiguity is for Congress 
to revisit and redefine WOTUS under the CWA through legislative 
amendment. A legislative amendment to the CWA is the most permanent
solution for resolving the ambiguity surrounding the WOTUS definition. 
The legislative amendment should narrow the scope of the CWA by 
restricting the expansive interpretations of “waters of the United States” 
to provide more certainty and respect for the rights of landowners. 
In making this amendment, the legislature should adopt Justice 
Scalia’s standard in Rapanos, effectively narrowing WOTUS “to include 
only permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies of water 
forming geographic features that are described in ordinary parlance as 
streams, oceans, rivers and lakes.”152 The amendment should further 
exclude from the definition any “channels through which waters flow 
intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide 
drainage for rainfall.”153 This amendment should effectively return the 
term “waters” to its commonsense definition. Finally, the amendment 
should expressly state that wetlands are only subject to the jurisdiction of 
the CWA when there exists a continuous surface connection to WOTUS. 
Adopting Justice Scalia’s interpretation and defining WOTUS under 
the CWA will rein in the confusion and constrain the expansive scope of 
the CWA. Narrowing the CWA to focus only on “waters” with a 
“continuous surface connection” prevents further overreaching regulation 
of wetlands. The terms “navigable” and “of the United States” should be 
abandoned to restrict the scope only to those water bodies forming 
geographic features. A narrow interpretation reduces the Corps’ 
jurisdiction under the Section 404 permitting process. Curtailing the scope 
of the CWA’s jurisdiction eases property owners’ fears of unwarranted 
fines, civil or criminal liability, and overregulation of private land.
Passing a legislative amendment is no easy task: Both houses of 
Congress have previously attempted to pass legislative amendments 
clarifying “waters of the United States” without success.154 The political 
influences affecting the EPA’s interpretation are not isolated to the 
Executive branch. Getting both houses of Congress to support a single 
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interpretation will be a difficult task. Taking the judicial uncertainty and 
Congress’s inaction into consideration, the EPA is currently in the best 
position to narrow the scope of WOTUS because of the deference given 
to agencies interpreting their own statutes. Arguably, Congress intended 
all along to leave it up to the EPA to make the interpretations. While that 
may have been the intent when drafting the CWA, the ambiguity has 
existed for more than thirty years without a clear resolution. The 
temporary nature and political back-and-forth of agency interpretations 
necessitates a legislative amendment to correct the ambiguity. 
In the alternative, if Congress cannot successfully pass a legislative 
amendment to the CWA, the EPA should stay its course and rescind and 
replace the CWR. The EPA’s current planned revision involves the 
adoption of Scalia’s opinion in Rapanos. This revision would achieve the 
narrowing of the WOTUS interpretation. In conducting the rulemaking 
process, the EPA needs to tread carefully and follow the APA 
requirements on rulemaking to ensure the revised rule is not struck down 
on the grounds of being arbitrary and capricious. Of course, this revision 
would be temporary because a new administration can always rescind the 
rule, but the EPA is still in the best position to quickly clarify the 
ambiguity.
CONCLUSION
The definition of “waters of the United States” has long been 
ambiguous and attempts to clarify the term have only added to the 
confusion. Various problems have arisen surrounding the government’s 
regulation of wetlands. Wetlands play an important role in the ecology of 
neighboring water bodies, but not all wetlands are within the scope of the 
CWA, nor should they be. The history of the EPA’s regulation under the
CWA has shown that the current definition of WOTUS is an unworkable, 
ambiguous categorization that has led to problems for courts and private 
landowners alike. A clear, workable definition is long overdue. These 
expansive agency interpretations must be reined in by narrowing the scope 
of waters governed by the CWA. 
The EPA can narrow the definition by altering the language to apply 
to only those standing or continuously flowing “water” bodies that form 
“geographical features.” This revision could come from the EPA through 
its rulemaking process. However, the problem with choosing this route is 
that it is a long process and subject to rescission whenever political power 
shifts.
A better, more permanent solution would be for Congress to revisit the 
CWA. An amendment to the CWA that defines “waters of the United 
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States” by applying the late Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos
would prevent the expansive regulation of non-navigable and non-adjacent 
wetlands. A narrow interpretation would provide further clarity and limit 
the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction under the Section 404 permit process. 
A legislative amendment embracing a narrower interpretation would allow 
for the protection of the “waters of the United States” from pollutants 
while also protecting the property rights over isolated wetlands. 
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